WI: Richard III had won the Battle of Bosworth Field?

Well, I couldn't get anything done Monday or Wednesday, but in my defense I just started a new job this week. Here's a Friday update regardless.

The Battle of Bosworth Field is one of the most famous battles of late medieval England and, thanks to Shakespeare, the one that most people remember when they hear of the Wars of the Roses. It was on Bosworth Field, August 22 1485, that Henry Tudor defeated Richard III of the House of York (itself a cadet branch of the House of Plantagenet) and took the throne of England, bringing an end to the 331-year rule of the Plantagenet dynasty and inaugurating the reign of the House of Tudor.

But what if...the outcome had been reversed, so that Richard had won at Bosworth instead? Henry Tudor's victory was not an inevitability, and Richard's defeat had more to do with treachery by several of his lords rather than any tactical genius on Tudor's part. He was betrayed by Thomas Stanley, who was Tudor's stepfather and showed little regard for the life of his son George (a hostage taken by Richard before the battle), and Henry Percy the 4th Earl of Northumberland, who resented Richard's refusal to grant him more authority over the north of England. Percy held his forces back at a critical juncture in the battle (when the Yorkist infantry under a more loyal vassal, the Duke of Norfolk, was defeated by its Lancastrian counterpart under the Earl of Oxford) while Stanley actually attacked Richard when he mounted his last desperate charge towards Tudor's position, dooming him.

So, what if either or both of these lords had stayed loyal? With their numbers strengthening his already numerically superior army, Richard would in all likelihood have won handily. If Northumberland stays loyal, the Yorkist infantry is reinforced at an important turning point and never falters, eventually resulting in the collapse of the numerically now far inferior Tudor foot: Richard never even has to engage in his famous charge. If Stanley aids Richard or even just holds back when the King charges at Tudor's position, Richard will almost certainly kill Tudor - he came extremely close to doing the job in our timeline, smiting Tudor's banner-bearer with one blow of his lance and unhorsing another of his bodyguards - and win the battle that way.

So, what happens in the medium to long term? Well, for one thing, the Wars of the Roses is effectively over. Richard will have eliminated the last viable Lancastrian claimant in Henry Tudor (who wasn't even a member of the House of Lancaster, another cadet branch of the Plantagenets, but was matrilineally related to them through the Beauforts, a branch of legitimized Lancastrian bastards). The House of York can reign securely from here on out.

Richard's immediate priority, besides hunting down and exterminating any Lancastrian stragglers, will be to find himself a new wife. His first wife, Anne Neville, died five months before the battle and their only child, Edward of Middleham, had died the year before at the age of ten. Thus, to secure his bloodline, Richard will need to remarry and father more sons as soon as he can. Historically, he was trying to negotiate a marriage to Joanna, Princess of Portugal when he was killed.

An alternative wife would be his niece, Elizabeth of York. Marrying her could smooth over tensions within the Yorkist faction between those who supported Richard and the partisans of the children of his brother and predecessor Edward IV, chiefly the family of Edward's wife Elizabeth Woodville. She has the problem of having been bastardized by Titulus Regius, the act of Parliament that made Richard king over her brothers (the Princes in the Tower, Edward V and Richard, Duke of York) in the first place.

In any case, if Richard marries either woman and father children with her, the future looks fairly bright for the House of York: they will have an England that is finally stable thanks to the extirpation of the heirs of the rival House of Lancaster, and opportunities to expand their influence abroad against Scotland (ruled by a weak king, James III) and France (soon to fall into its own civil war between the regency of Anne de Beaujeu and the great magnates of the kingdom). England will probably involve itself more heavily on the continent, as Richard had been a fervent advocate of war with France during the reign of Edward IV.

If Richard has no more children, the House of Plantagenet will come to an end with his later death anyway, and be replaced by the House de la Pole - Richard had named John de la Pole, Earl of Lincoln and his nephew by his middle sister Elizabeth, his heir after the death of his own son. In this case, King John II may face challenges from supporters of the Plantagenets who rally around either Richard's other living (though imprisoned) nephew Edward, Earl of Warwick and son of Richard's third brother George, Duke of Clarence or an impostor like the ones who challenged Henry Tudor's reign historically, such as Lambert Simnel (who pretended to be the Earl of Warwick) and Perkin Warbeck (who pretended to be Richard Duke of York, the younger Prince in the Tower).

Restoration

Well, today's my birthday. And on that note I'd like to say I'm getting back to this blog after a four-month hiatus, which I took to work on a game and, well, actual work. I'm starting a new job next Wednesday but, starting Monday the 28th, will still try to go back to regular updates; every Monday, Wednesday and Friday.

WI: Charles, Prince of Viana survives?

Finally back, was busy all Holy Week. Without further ado...

Charles, Prince of Viana is one of those historical characters who is little known to the public, but whose fate was massively important to the development of late medieval and early modern European history. The only son of John II of Aragon and his first wife Blanche, Queen of Navarre, Prince Charles' relationship with his father turned bitter after John remarried to the Castilian noblewoman Juana Enriquez (who hated Charles, considering him a threat to the prosperity of her own son Ferdinand, and did everything she could to turn John against him) and then tried to deny Charles his rightful inheritance - the crown of Navarre - following Blanche's death in 1441. Charles was unwilling to let go of his maternal inheritance without a fight, so fight they did, and eventually father triumphed over son: Charles was defeated and imprisoned by John in 1452, eventually released (but denied the Navarrese crown) and jailed again in 1459 for attempting to marry the Castilian princess Isabella, who would eventually become Queen of Castile and wife to his half-brother Ferdinand.

Alas, there was no happy and glorious ending for Charles himself. In 1461, his father was forced to release him from prison to satisfy the demands of Catalan rebels who resented his efforts to expand his royal prerogative at the expense of Catalonia's traditional autonomy. However, not long afterwards, Charles was poisoned - likely by his stepmother - and Ferdinand became the undisputed heir to the Aragonese throne. Ferdinand would go on to marry Isabella and become one half of the Catholic Monarchs who united Spain, complete the Reconquista by destroying the last Muslim state in Iberia, and oversee the dawn of the Spanish Empire 'on which the sun never sets'.

But what if...Charles does not die at his stepmother's hands? Perhaps he prevails over his grasping father in the Navarrese civil war and forces John to recognize him as Charles IV of Navarre, or John never bothers to infringe on his son's succession rights in the first place. Either way, with an independent power-base and stronghold secured in Navarre, Charles becomes much safer from his stepmother.

Even more interestingly, Charles was originally married to Agnes of Cleves, a niece of the Burgundian duke Philip the Good: sadly, Agnes died childless at the age of 26 in 1448, and Charles would eventually get into hot water with his father again when he pursued Isabella of Castile, who would eventually marry his half-brother Ferdinand after his death. Of course, if Agnes still dies on schedule and Charles lives long enough to marry Isabella, then a Castilian-Aragonese Spain will still be born, just with a different father. But if Agnes lives longer and bears an also-longer-lived Charles children, then the unification of Castile and Aragon is butterflied away. Instead, Aragon will unite with Navarre and remain independent of Castile, allowing Charles and his successors to focus on Mediterranean ventures: uniting with their distant Trastamaran kin in Naples and battling the Muslims of the Barbary Coast.

So, what happens to Castile in this scenario? Well, they had a succession crisis of their own brewing at the same time that John and Charles were fighting. Isabella's uncle was the weak king of Castile, Henry IV 'the Impotent', who had only one child of dubious parentage with his infamously unfaithful wife Joan of Portugal: this daughter, also named Joan, was nicknamed 'La Beltraneja' after a rumor that she was actually the child of Beltran de la Cueva, Duke of Albuquerque and one of her mother's many lovers. After Henry died in 1475, Castile fell into civil war between the supporters of Joan and Isabella (who claimed that Joan was a bastard, and so Henry should be succeeded by his indisputably trueborn niece), with Joan being supported by her uncle and husband Afonso V of Portugal and Isabella being backed by her own husband Ferdinand, by then King of Aragon. Of course, historically, the 'Isabelino' party and Ferdinand defeated the 'Juanistas' and their Portuguese backers, solidifying Isabella's hold on the Castilian throne and paving the way for the formation of Spain.

But without Aragon's help, Isabella's chances of victory grow much dimmer. Thus, we could very well see a different Spain formed by the unification of Castile and Portugal. This alternate Spain would still destroy the Sultanate of Granada, the last Islamic kingdom left in Iberia at the time: by the late 1400s, the situation for the Spanish Moors had grown hopeless, and Granada is too heavily outnumbered and outgunned to have a prayer against any Spain regardless of whether it is comprised of Castile-Aragon or Castile-Portugal - their defeat is only a matter of time. However, after the Reconquista is complete Alt-Spain would be free to focus on colonial ventures abroad and wars against the Muslims in the Maghreb with no other major European commitments to bog them down: this means a unified Spanish-Portuguese colonial empire, and the availability of far more resources for a crusade into Morocco and beyond. Thus, while Aragon-Navarre focuses on Mediterranean ventures, Castile-Portugal would be free to dominate the New World to an even greater extent than the historical Spanish Empire and conquer the western Maghreb, in the process saving the Songhai Empire from conquest by the Moroccans. Given enough time and resources, they might even expand into what is now modern-day West Africa (particularly Mali).

WI: The Ottomans are defeated at the Battle of Nicopolis?

In 1396, the penultimate true crusade against the Muslims had crossed the Danube and was on course to clearing the Turks out of Bulgaria, which they had conquered from the native Orthodox Shishman dynasty only three years prior. The crusader army - a mixture of Germans, Hungarians, Frenchmen, Croats and Italians with a supporting contingent from Wallachia (modern-day southern Romania) and Bulgarian exiles led by the Holy Roman Emperor Sigismund - had taken the fortified towns of Vidin and Oryahovo without much of a fight, though that did not stop the especially reckless and bloodthirsty French contingent from massacring the unfortunate inhabitants of the latter, when they reached and laid siege to Nicopolis. Due to its stronger walls and their lack of siege engines, the crusaders could not take Nicopolis by storm, and while they were trying to starve the city into surrender an Ottoman relief force (including a contingent of Christian Serbs, whose ruler Stefan Lazarevic was a Turkish vassal) led by Sultan Bayezid I emerged to their south.

After learning of the Ottoman approach, Sigismund called a war council to form up the crusaders' battle plan. With the support of other senior commanders such as Lord Enguerrand of Coucy, he advocated sending the Wallachian contingent in first to combat the lightly-equipped Turkish vanguard, after which the French knights would follow them to smash through the weakened Turkish center and his own forces would keep the Turks on the flanks occupied. The plan was rejected by the younger French commanders, chiefly Count Philip of Eu and Count Jean of Nevers (the future Duke of Burgundy), who believed that having to follow the Wallachian infantry into battle would be an insult to men of their noble stature. In the resulting battle, the French launched into a reckless charge that went through the Turkish infantry, lines of stakes, and up a hill - only to be countered and crushed by the Sultan's reserves. The Wallachians, believing the battle to be lost, retreated, and the rest of the crusader army was promptly crushed.

But what if...the crusaders had prevailed instead? Perhaps the French crusaders exhibit better discipline, and D'Eu & Nevers calm down enough to accept Sigismund's battle plans. The Wallachians engage the Turks first, trading volleys of arrows and battling the Turkish infantry to soften up their lines before the French charge in to break through the Turkish center. When they advance up the hills to face the Turk reserve, the crusaders are better prepared and organized - instead of facing just the exhausted and (thanks to the Turkish stake traps) mostly dismounted French knights, the Turks are forced to face the entire crusader army - and win the day. Bayezid, who personally commanded the Turkish reserve, is killed and his forces routed utterly.

So what happens? Well, for starters, Bulgaria will be freed from Turkish control. Sigismund recognized the claim of Prince Fruzhin, the second son of the last Bulgarian Tsar Ivan Shishman (the eldest son, Alexander had accepted Ottoman rule and converted to Islam), to the Bulgarian throne and would have proclaimed him the Tsar of the Third Bulgarian Empire. From Bulgaria, the crusaders will surely try to expel the Turks from the Balkans in their entirety. That means battling through Macedonia and Thessaly, an endeavor in which they might be joined by the opportunistic Byzantine Empire if the latter feels that closing off the Gallipoli straits and fighting the Turks in the field once more is worth the risk of losing what remains of their lands. The best-case scenario for the Christians is that they succeed in evicting the Turks from the Balkans entirely, the Byzantines regain Thrace, and most of Macedonia becomes a new crusader kingdom likely ruled by D'Eu or one of the German, Hungarian or Croat nobles in Sigismund's service.

The Turks on the other hand, may or may not pull together in time to face off with the crusader threat. Bayezid I had two sons of age to succeed him by the time of Nicopolis: Prince Suleiman, the elder, and Prince Isa, the second son. (he had many more sons but the third-oldest of them and his eventual successor in real life, Prince Mehmed, was only 7 at the time of Nicopolis) Historically, when Bayezid was taken prisoner by the Timurid Empire and the Ottoman sultanate thrown into chaos in 1402, his sons clashed with one another for the throne; here, if Suleiman and Isa fight one another while the crusaders are still bearing down on them, an Ottoman defeat is all but guaranteed and Isa, being based in Anatolia and thus further away from the crusaders, will most likely win. If either brother rallies behind the other however, they have a chance at averting disaster and containing the Christian advance to just Bulgaria.

WI: The Roman Kingdom is never overthrown?

In 509 BC, the monarchical government which had ruled the city-state of Rome for over 200 years since its founding by Romulus was ousted and a republic proclaimed. The usurper Lucius Tarquinius Superbus, also known as 'Tarquin the Proud', was deposed in a coup led by his nephew Lucius Junius Brutus (legendary ancestor of the very same Marcus Junius Brutus who dealt the deathblow to Julius Caesar many centuries later) after his son Sextus raped the virtuous noblewoman Lucretia, wife of his friend Lucius Tarquinius Collatinus. Soon after Lucretia's suicide, Tarquin the Proud and his clan were banished from Rome; Brutus was offered their crown but refused it; and ultimately the patricians (nobility) and plebeians (commoners) of Rome jointly voted in favor of ending the monarchy and establishing a republican government, with Brutus and Collatinus elected as its first Consuls.

Tarquin, as may be expected of someone with the epithet 'The Proud', did not accept his deposition gracefully. He first tried to reach out to royalist elements within the newborn Republic (including two of Brutus' sons), but when this 'Tarquinian Conspiracy' was squashed before the end of 509 BC, he turned to building alliances with the nearby Etruscan and Latin petty-kings. However, he was defeated by the Republicans at the battles of Silva Arsia (509 BC) and Lake Regillus (496 BC), and even in 508 BC the attempt where he got closest to regaining his throne was foiled when his ally, the Etruscan king Lars Porsenna of Clusium, negotiated a peace treaty with the Republic that didn't include Tarquin's restoration. After Lake Regillus, Tarquin evidently gave up on trying to win back his throne and died in obscurity in Cumae a year later.

But what if...Tarquin succeeded in reclaiming the Roman throne? It doesn't particularly matter whether the Tarquinian Conspiracy is successful, or he leads his royalists and allies to victory at Silva Arsia or Lake Regillus, or Lars Porsenna restores him to kingship in 508 BC. The important thing is that Tarquin is once more reinstated as King of Rome, strangles the dream of the Roman Republic in its cradle, and almost certainly undertakes a brutal purge of anyone he deems even remotely suspicious.

What are the long-term effects? Far too many to count, really. First and foremost, Tarquin was an incompetent and unpopular tyrant, and his three sons Titus, Arruns and Sextus do not appear to have been much different; thus, Rome is unlikely to become particularly successful under their rule. Most likely, it remains one of many small squabbling Italian city-states and falls under Etruscan influence (the Tarquinii themselves were an Etruscan clan). Unless an Etruscan king of great ability & ambition steps up, Italy will thus likely remain a disunified morass of minor kingdoms, tribes and (in the south) Greek city-states well into the foreseeable future.

Rome never becoming a great power means tremendous and unpredictable changes in the course of the Mediterranean Basin's history. Carthage, which by 509 BC had gained control of Sicily and Sardinia, is likely to become the dominant power in the western Mediterranean: however, as a maritime republic dominated by mercantile interests, the Carthaginians are unlikely to be as insistent about total conquest and direct rule as the Romans were, and instead settle for ruling their hinterland possessions through client monarchs while only colonizing and directly governing the coasts. The Celts would still have free reign across much of northern and western Europe, until and unless they are displaced by the Germanic peoples. Iberia would remain a battleground between the Carthaginians in the south/east and the native Iberians and Celts in the north/west.

Out east, as of 509 BC the Persian Empire has yet to invade Greece proper. It is, however, nearing its maximum territorial extent under Shah Darius I, and has already absorbed Macedon two years before the fall of the Tarquinii. The butterfly effect may result in the Persians conquering Greece after all, which would change the course of Western civilization in so many ways that a hundred-page paper wouldn't provide sufficient coverage. Alternatively, they could still fail before the combined strength and determination of the Greek city-states...in which case, the future remains extremely unpredictable. Perhaps the Athenians and their Delian League will prevail over the Spartans' Peloponnesian League in this timeline's equivalent of the Peloponnesian War, if one even happens? Perhaps Alexander the Great will never be born, or fails to defeat Persia utterly? Or if he is and still manages to repeat his conquests, the East would remain divided among the Diadochi with no Rome to crush them all, unless by some miracle he leaves behind a strong heir capable of holding together a realm stretching from Corfu to Pakistan. Only one thing is certain about a world where Rome never becomes a major power: it would look completely unrecognizable to modern eyes.

WI: Germany loses the Franco-Prussian War?

Had to get my braces tightened last Friday. Wasn't expecting it to be too bad (this is the second time and I already took an Advil in preparation for it) but although the tightening itself didn't almost leave me in tears like the first time around, it did leave me with a much more persistent pain and soreness in my teeth/jaw. Were it not for that, I'd have posted something Friday...but, no use crying over spilled milk. The pain's mostly faded by now, so have a new post.

In 1870, the Second French Empire was provoked into declaring war on the Prussia-led North German Confederation by the latter's Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, who manipulated the Ems Telegram reporting French demands to his king in a way that deliberately insulted the French. Bismarck wanted this war to get the remaining German states (save for the Austro-Hungarian Empire) to fall in line behind Prussian leadership, making a united Germany a reality.

The Prussians and their German allies took advantage of their superior artillery, railroads and mobilization system to rapidly overwhelm the reckless and poorly led French, resulting in an utter victory capped off with their triumphant march into Paris nine months later. The House of Bonaparte fell from power for the last time, Germany was united, and the newborn Third French Republic would harbor a deep resentment over the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by the German Empire that contributed to the outbreak of World War I 43 years later.

But what if...the French had been better prepared for the struggle, and thus managed to win? The smartest move Napoleon III could have undertaken would be to not respond to Bismarck's provocations at all, but that would be out of character for a man as vain and reckless in foreign policy (witness his ultimately disastrous attempt to make Archduke Maximilian of Austria into the Emperor of Mexico from 1864-67, which served no reasonable goal for France). Thus, assuming Napoleon still goes to war, his best chance would have been to use France's larger standing army to invade the Rhineland before the German alliance can fully mobilize its strength; historically, the French were too slow on the draw and the Germans mobilized in two weeks, after which the French high command lost its nerve and made the disastrous decision to fight defensively.

So, that is the point of divergence: the French move faster and more aggressively right out of the gate, with Napoleon III directing his forces from Thionville towards Trier in the Rhineland. The Prussians are unable to mobilize quickly enough to stop the French before they occupy the Rhineland, and their smaller standing army loses a few battles trying (and failing) to prevent this outcome. King Wilhelm I of Prussia loses his nerve and backs down, ending the war in a French victory.

So, what happens? A short, victorious war is exactly what Napoleon III needs to shore up his regime's crumbling domestic popularity after the debacle that was his Mexican intervention and amidst the growing strength of Republican conspiracies: with a major victory over the 'upstart Prussians' under his belt and French patriotic fervor spiking to new heights, his rule over France will become virtually unassailable. The Emperor would be giddy at his triumph and annex as much of the Rhineland as he can get away with (and likely Luxembourg too, as he nearly annexed it in 1867 before Prussian threats and British mediation got him to back down), to the fury of the German people and the great consternation of the rest of Europe. The conservative pro-war party in Paris, led by Napoleon's wife Eugenie of Montijo, would also be a beneficiary. Napoleon's son, the Prince-Imperial Napoleon Eugene, would succeed him either in 1873 when he dies or a little earlier than that if he abdicates (by 1870, Napoleon III was an old and sickly man well past his physical prime). The rump Papal States (consisting of Rome and its environs) would still survive under Bonaparte protection, making for a persistent sore point in Franco-Italian relations.

On the flipside, it would be Germany that develops a deep desire for vengeance on France, not the other way around. The unification of Germany would still likely occur (albeit more slowly), this time driven by fear and loathing of French aggression rather than a jubilant sense of triumph over the old Napoleonic enemy, even if Bismarck is sacked by King Wilhelm: by this point in time, Prussia has already consolidated northern Germany into a confederacy led by itself while only Baden, Bavaria, Hesse-Darmstadt and Wurttemberg remained nominally independent, and even they had effectively become Prussian vassals after the former's victory over Austria in 1866. An alternative possibility is that the southern German states remain independent, break their ties with Prussia over Bismarck's failure to deliver victory, and gravitate back towards Austria: however, the Prussia-led North German Confederation is here to stay. Whether as the head of a united Germany or just the NGF, the Prussians would pine after the Rhineland just as France historically did over Alsace-Lorraine.

The grand European alliance networks which historically built up to WWI would change quite radically in the world of a French victory over Prussia. France would pursue links with Austria-Hungary and Russia to contain the vengeful Prussians/Germans. On the other hand, Britain would continue to see France as its old enemy (as the Germans would not be considered a worthy rival for world dominance in a world where they lost the Franco-Prussian War) and align with the Germans and Turks, their old allies, instead of engaging in a diplomatic reversal to ally with long-time rivals France and Russia as they did historically. The Italians would naturally gravitate towards the Anglo-German/Prussian bloc, out of a desire to complete their own national unification by seizing the French-backed Papal States and Austrian-held Venetia & southern Tyrol.

Napoleon IV may opt to marry Princess Beatrice of Britain, Queen Victoria's youngest child, to cool tensions with the British, or the Austro-Hungarian Kaiser Franz Josef's eldest surviving daughter Archduchess Gisela to reinforce a Franco-Austrian alliance against Prussia. Either way, he was historically a hot-blooded and warlike prince (to the point of getting himself killed fighting the Zulus) - by 1870 he is 14, and thus it may be too late to change his personality - and if he chooses to follow in his father's footsteps & assert French power on a global scale, confrontation with Britain (regardless of whether or not he marries Princess Beatrice) becomes inevitable. World War I would likely still occur, if not from Austrian tensions in the Balkans then certainly from Anglo-French tensions in Africa or Asia and the lingering Franco-German rivalry: this time, it will pit a Franco-Russo-Austrian 'Entente' against an Anglo-Germano/Prusso-Turko-Italian 'Alliance'. As for who would win such a contest, there are too many variables between a French victory in 1870/1 and how & when this conflict will break out to answer such a question.

Hiatus over. WI: Atenism survives?

Finally back in the saddle, illness and job hunting have kept me away from this blog for far too long. As usual, I'll update every Monday, Wednesday and Friday. Without further ado:

The aten, or Egyptian sun disk

In 1353 BC, the throne of Egypt passed from Pharaoh Amenhotep III to his eldest son, also named Amenhotep. The first five years of Amenhotep IV's reign were uneventful, as the new Pharaoh occupied himself with building projects - including, though few would have found it questionable or guessed that it was a sign of things to come, temples to the 'Aten' or Egyptian sun disk. However, in his fifth year, Amenhotep renamed himself 'Akhenaten' ('effective for Aten') and abandoned the traditional Egyptian pantheon in favor of worshiping Aten, built a new city called 'Akhetaten' to serve as his capital, and disbanded the priesthoods of the other gods.

However, Akhenaten died after seventeen years on the throne of Egypt, and the cult of Aten waned soon after. The royal succession that followed his death was chaotic: he was first succeeded by a woman called Neferneferuaten, whose identity is unclear - she was either his Great Royal Wife (principal spouse) Nefertiti or one of their daughters - and then by his son Tutankhaten, the famous King Tut, who was only nine or ten at the time of his ascension to the throne and who spent his reign under the thumb of powerful advisers. It was due to the influence of these powerful conservative statesmen, such as the Grand Vizier Ay and the general Horemheb, that Tutankhaten reversed his father's efforts to establish an Atenist religion in favor of restoring the traditional Egyptian faith. Tutankhamun died young and the throne was eventually usurped by Horemheb, who mounted a campaign to erase as many traces of the Atenist period as he could.

But what if...Atenism had not faltered? Perhaps Akhenaten does not die while his son Tutankhaten is still underage, but instead lives another decade: thus, by the time he dies Tutankhaten is not approximately seven years old (as he was nine or ten when he took the throne two years later) but seventeen or eighteen, old enough and sufficiently indoctrinated into the Atenist faith that he will not simply do whatever the Amunist Ay and Horemheb ask of him. Then, Tutankhaten living longer (perhaps he never contracts malaria nor breaks his leg, both of which led to his historical death) and managing to father an heir with his sister-wife Ankhesenpaaten (historically renamed Ankhesenamun) would solidify the place of the Atenist faith in Old Egypt.

What are the medium to long-term effects? Well, most obviously, we are likely to get a reversal of Horemheb's campaign to erase all traces of Atenism and Akhenaten as well as his successors. Instead, the priesthood of the old Egyptian gods would still be suppressed and their objects of worship destroyed in favor of new Atenist replacements. Instead of a diverse extended family of gods and goddesses, Egyptians would now direct their prayers and hymns to the great sun disc alone in temples.

Politically, a longer-lived Atenism would reinforce the process of centralization in Egypt that was already going on at the time of Akhenaten's reign. Under Atenist belief, nobody could directly worship the Aten except the Pharaoh and his wife: everyone else was still supposed to worship the Pharaoh as an intermediary between them and the Aten, in a continuation of the traditional worship of the Pharaoh as the intermediary between the divine and the Egyptian people. Akhenaten also centralized control of the army, national administration and religion (priestly goods and estates were confiscated for the state in his reign) into his new capital at Akhetaten, a process which was reportedly open to corruption among royal officials but would have continued unimpeded in a world where Atenism lasted longer.

Akhenaten reigning longer would also have positive implications for Egypt's foreign policy. Despite the initial laxness of his foreign policy where it concerned the stability of the Egyptian sphere of influence in the Levant - among the cache of Amarna Letters, archived correspondence between Akhenaten's government and their Levantine vassals, were sixty letters from the vassal-king Rib-Hadda of Byblos in Lebanon begging for Akhenaten's aid against the encroachment of the rival kingdom of Amurru, which Akhenaten replied to with increasingly annoyed refusals until Rib-Hadda was ultimately killed - Akhenaten did ultimately manage to preserve Egypt's hold over most of the Levant in the face of the growing Hittite Empire to the north. Should he live longer and Tutankhaten avoid an early death, Egypt may have been able to keep most of the Levant under its influence rather than lose Syria to the Hittites, as Tutankhaten/amun's successor Ay did after he provoked a Hittite invasion by assassinating a Hittite prince who was en route to marry Tut's widow Ankhesenamun.

Cold

I've recently come down with a nasty cold, so there won't be updates for a bit. (this is also why I didn't post anything new yesterday) Hopefully this clears up over the weekend at the absolute latest.

WI: The Tokugawa are defeated at Osaka, 1615?

Historically, the Siege of Osaka in 1615 marked the conclusion of Japan's Sengoku (Warring States) period by re-affirming the dominance of the Tokugawa clan over the entire country. The Toyotomi clan which preceded the Tokugawa, established by the peasant-turned-warlord Toyotomi Hideyoshi, was wiped out when their seat of Osaka Castle finally fell - Hideyoshi's son Hideyori, whose authority had been usurped by the Tokugawa shogun Ieyasu while he was still a child, committed suicide with his mother Yodo-dono as the Tokugawa forces overran their fortress after a seven month siege, while Hideyori's eight-year-old son Kunimatsu was captured and ruthlessly beheaded by the Tokugawa soon afterwards.

However, things did not have to end that way. The first half of the siege (November 1614-January 1615) concluded with a negotiated peace settlement, where the Toyotomi swore allegiance to the Tokugawa and destroyed Osaka's outer defenses, most notably filling in their own moat. Historically, this just made it easier for the Tokugawa to finish them off when they broke the peace agreement three months later. Even then, Ieyasu was badly wounded by a spear thrust in a desperate Toyotomi sally late in the second half of the siege.

But what if...these two events proceed in the Toyotomi's favor? Say, if Toyotomi Hideyori were to correctly see that Tokugawa Ieyasu's peace offering would just make it easier to finish his clan off in the next round, and spurns him - perhaps Ieyasu's powerful Western-style cannons kill Hideyori's mother, as opposed to just a few of her handmaids as happened historically, and this well and truly pisses off the normally timid and mild-mannered Hideyori. Instead of the first half of the Siege of Osaka ending in a three-month ceasefire where the Toyotomi's defenses are weakened, the siege continues and the Toyotomi accelerate their plans for a glorious last stand. Led by Hideyori himself and brave, competent commanders such as Sanada Yukimura and Gotou Motosugu, the Toyotomi forces sally forth in the dead of winter, catch the Tokugawa by surprise, and inflict significant casualties - including Ieyasu himself, felled by a lucky spear thrust. Though the Tokugawa army still greatly outnumbers the Toyotomi, they retreat in disorder from Osaka's environs, demoralized by their heavy casualties and the shock of their wizened leader's death.

So what happens? The Tokugawa clan is now led in more than just name by Ieyasu's oldest surviving son (and coincidentally, Hideyori's father-in-law) Hidetada, a mediocre leader who lacked his father's political savvy and military talent. Ieyasu had officially abdicated the office of Shogun to Hidetada in 1605, but still reigned as the power behind his son's throne until his historical death in 1616; here, Hidetada is suddenly forced to stand on his own without his father's guidance, in a time of renewed turmoil. Hidetada's position is further threatened by his younger half-brother Matsudaira Tadateru, Ieyasu's favorite son, who is popular with the eastern daimyo (feudal lords) and may well capitalize on the opportunity to challenge Hidetada for their father's legacy in this moment of vulnerability.

On the flipside, the Toyotomi faction will have gone from being dead men walking to the accidental masters of western and central Japan. Many of the western daimyo - the Mori, Shimazu and Chosokabe being among their most prominent members - had previously supported the Toyotomi against Ieyasu in the earlier Sekigahara Campaign of 1600 and were marginalized under the new Tokugawa order for it; presented with the opportunity to overthrow the Tokugawa entirely and regain what they lost under Ieyasu, there is little chance that they won't help Toyotomi. (indeed, the Chosokabe clan which dominated Shikoku had already sided with the Toyotomi at Osaka historically, and were destroyed for it) Thus Japan will likely regress into a sort of condensed Sengoku period pitting Toyotomi Hideyori in the west, Matsudaira Tadateru in the east and north, and Tokugawa Hidetada caught between them both in the middle against one another.

Foreigners, too, will have a role to play. The Catholic Spanish and Portuguese would see an opportunity to regain influence in Japan with Toyotomi, who historically enjoyed broad support from the Christian (in feudal Japan, universally Catholic) daimyo during the Sekigahara Campaign: at a minimum, they can expect him to lift the restrictions his father Hideyoshi had imposed on Catholics and to give them exclusive trade privileges at the expense of their Protestant, generally pro-Tokugawa Dutch and English rivals. Said Protestant powers, and particularly the Dutch who cared far more about trade than proselytizing, would naturally find it in their interest to side with Hidetada or Matsudaira. Firearms have become ubiquitous throughout Japan by this point in time, but not cannons: the Tokugawa famously fielded batteries of powerful Western-styled and built cannons at Osaka Castle, and so all sides' backers will likely furnish them with artillery at the minimum.

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WI: China is never united?

Going to try for a shorter format starting tonight, particularly cutting down the summary of the real historical events in every scenario...

The united Chinese nation first emerged in 221 BC after Qin Shi Huang, king of the petty-kingdom of Qin in modern-day Shaanxi Province, forcibly united the fragmented Chinese kingdoms of the Warring States Period (475-221 BC) and proclaimed himself the first Emperor of China, elevating himself above the previous nominal rulers of China from the Shang & Zhou dynasties who called themselves 'kings'.

Qin Shi Huang was a notoriously brutal ruler and the dynasty he established barely outlasted him (his incompetent son and heir, Qin Er Shi, ruled for three years before the Qin collapsed entirely in 207 BC), but the importance of his act of unifying China cannot be overstated. The Qin gave China a strong central government and bureaucratic administration, a standardized writing system and currency, and even lent China their name ('China' was derived from 'Chin', a corruption of 'Qin' in western lands). They made it possible for the Han dynasty to reunite the North China Plain within five years of their own collapse, and the Han would go on to use the consolidated resources and administrative apparatus of the Qin to fuel their own wars of expansion into Korea, across the Yangtze and westward as far as the Tarim Basin, spreading Chinese cultural influence across much of mainland East Asia.

But what if...China was never united? Perhaps Qin Shi Huang is defeated in his war with Chu, the largest of the Warring States and one of the most powerful - but he manages to hurt Chu badly enough that it, too, does not have the strength to fill the power vacuum left by his death and unite China under its own banner. Thus, 'China' remains a fragmented collection of petty kingdoms, all with their own customs and traditions, with no ability to expand far beyond the North China Plain.

What are the medium to long term effects? In four words: too many to count. A world without a united China would quickly cease to resemble our world at all. No united China means no Silk Road, no Great Wall, no Chinese influence pervading mainland East Asia from Korea to Vietnam and later into Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines.

What we recognize today as Han Chinese culture would be limited to the North China Plain (presuming the divided states of the Plain don't get destroyed entirely by northern nomads such as the Xiongnu with no Great Wall to stop them), while the lands south of the Yangtze would still be dominated by the tribes & kingdoms of the native Yue people. For that matter, there wouldn't be a single Chinese culture or writing system either: the Warring States all had their own dialects and scripts which reflected local influences, which were only eliminated after the Qin conquest.

Another result of Chinese disunity would be continued diversity in intellectual discourse in China. Qin Shi Huang infamously burned texts and purged scholars that failed to step in line with his government's official philosophy of Legalism (which supported his autocratic style of governance), ending a period of intellectual flowering known as the 'Hundred Schools of Thought'. Without Qin authority becoming supreme throughout China, or a united Chinese civilization emerging at all, many of these suppressed schools of thought and philosophy would not have been lost forever. Confucianism, Taoism and Legalism would still have many competitors, perhaps chief among them Mohism (a philosophy that promoted austerity, self-restraint and rationalism which was historically absorbed into Confucianism after the Qin came to power).

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WI: The Merovingians remained on the French throne?

The Merovingians were the founding dynasty of France, ruling from 486 to 751. Their founder and most prominent member was Clovis I, a king of the Salian Frankish tribe who united most of his people and destroyed a Roman remnant in northern-central France (the 'Domain of Soissons') in 486, conquered the Alamanni living in what is now Alsace-Lorraine, northern Switzerland and western Germany a decade later, and finally expanded Frankish power southward into Aquitaine by defeating the Visigoths of Spain at Vouillé in 507.

When Clovis died, his empire was partitioned between his sons, revealing a major weakness of the Merovingian dynasty - their tendency to divide a previous monarch's lands between his children (a practice which you might recognize as 'gavelkind' if you're an expert in land tenure and inheritance laws, or like me you play a lot of Crusader Kings II). This prevented the Merovingians from properly consolidating power and creating a permanently unified kingdom out of the Franks. Neustria and Austrasia, as the western and eastern halves of the Frankish kingdom were called, often warred with one another under rival Merovingian rulers, further weakening the dynasty.

Over the 7th and 8th centuries, the Merovingian kings became so feeble that they were reduced to being figureheads for their 'Mayors of the Palace' (majordomos). Known as rois fainéants ('do-nothing kings'), most of these Merovingians aimlessly wasted away on their thrones while their majordomos did all the real ruling: a few, most prominently Chilperic II (715-721), tried to reassert their authority but failed. Their atrophied dynasty was finally officially dethroned by Pepin the Short, the son of the Frankish war hero and Austrasian Mayor of the Palace Charles Martel who defeated Chilperic, in 751 with the support of the Pope, closing the Merovingian chapter of French history and beginning that of the Carolingians. The last Merovingian King of the Franks, Childeric III, was banished to a monastery with his son Theuderic and faded into obscurity there.

But what if...the Merovingians were able to retain their throne? A good point-of-divergence to enable this would be Chilperic II's war with Charles Martel. Unlike his roi fainéant predecessors, Chilperic was an able warrior and enjoyed the backing of the Neustrian nobility, led by Mayor of the Palace Ragenfrid. He had nearly completely defeated Martel by 716, only to be undone when the Austrasians ambushed his forces at Amblève while he was making his triumphant ride back from Cologne. But if Chilperic had been able to predict Martel's ambush at Amblève and crush him permanently, he would have bought his dynasty a new lease on life.

So what are the medium to long-term effects? Well firstly, Chilperic wouldn't even be close to finished with having overmighty nominal second-in-command figures in his life after Martel is dealt with. He needs to watch his back around Ragenfrid, who would now be the undisputed Mayor of the Palace of both Neustria and Austrasia. Fortunately for Chilperic, Ragenfrid's support among the Neustrian nobility was not ironclad, and he may find opportunities to isolate his majordomo with the support of rival Neustrian aristocrats. If Chilperic can achieve that, he will not have to fear being overthrown as Childeric III was historically.

Chilperic and the Merovingian monarchs after him, mindful of how their precursors had been reduced to irrelevance and were nearly utterly undone by Charles Martel, will do their damndest to claw back royal authority from the Mayors of the Palace (not just Ragenfrid but also those who come after him) and rule the Franks in more than just name. As the Merovingians will likely be focused on rebuilding their royal prerogative and countering Islamic aggression (see below), they are unlikely to embark on Charlemagne's historical wars of expansion into Italy and beyond the Rhine, at least not in the 8th or even early 9th centuries depending on how long it takes them to consolidate their authority. Finally, the pagan Frisians (living in what is now the northern Netherlands) may well remain independent for longer as well: Radbod, the most powerful Frisian ruler at the time of Charles Martel's struggle for Francia, was an ally-of-convenience of Chilperic & Ragenfrid against Charles Martel, and would have benefited from a Francia too busy with internal problems and the Muslims to meddle in his affairs just as the Lombards in Italy would have.

The Islamic invasion of the early 730s is likely to end the same way it did historically, with a defeat for the Umayyad Caliphate. Not only were their forces operating at the extreme end of the Islamic world's logistical tether (the Muslim army that historically invaded France lacked proper clothing to deal with winter weather and lived off the land), but the Muslims were already defeated once by Odo the Great, Duke of Aquitaine, in 721 - 11 years before the much better known confrontation at Tours. Chilperic and Ragenfrid, as reasonably competent generals in their own right, could well have fended off the Umayyad incursion just as Charles Martel did historically (especially if they fought the Muslims at Tours like Martel did, where they would enjoy a strong terrain advantage). Unless they are able to regain their domestic authority very quickly however, the Merovingians will most likely be slower than the Carolingians to counterattack and establish any sort of Frankish March in Catalonia.

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Thank you for reading all the way to the conclusion! If you like what you've just read, then by all means, please leave a comment. For that matter, if you don't like what you read, leave a comment anyway. I would be happy to receive any questions, suggestions or (civil) criticism you might have.

What If: The English prevailed at the Battle of Ashingdon?

By the year 1016, the English (Anglo-Saxons) found themselves in danger of once again falling under the yoke of the Norse after enjoying a century of freedom and security thanks to the victories of Alfred the Great and his children. A number of internal conflicts (including the temporary division of England between brothers Edwy and Edgar the Peaceable until the former's death in 959 and the assassination of Edgar's eldest son Edward the Martyr by his second wife Ælfthryth in 978) and the reign of a weak king in Æthelred the Unready, son of Ælfthryth and Edward the Martyr's younger half-brother, made the kingdom much easier pickings for the Norse, particularly the Danish. Æthelred at first paid the Danes tribute ('Danegeld') to stay away from his shores, but when he tried to renege on this agreement and massacre Danish settlers in England on St. Brice's Day in 1002, the Danish king Sweyn Forkbeard invaded England several times and finally succeeded in overrunning the country in 1013, forcing Æthelred to flee abroad.

When Sweyn died in 1014, Æthelred was able to engineer his own restoration to the English throne with the aid of loyal nobles. He died two years later and was succeeded by his second son Edmund Ironside, who had established himself as a formidable warrior and had even previously revolted against Æthelred. Sweyn's son Canute battled Edmund for control of England and eventually scored a decisive victory over the English at the Battle of Ashingdon ('Assandun'), 18 October 1016, thanks in no small part to the treachery of one of Edmund's vassals: Eadric Streona, ealdorman of Mercia. The two kings divided England, with Edmund controlling only Wessex, and promised that whoever lived longer would inherit the other's kingdom; conveniently for Canute, Edmund died on 30 November that year, allowing him to take over all of England for his 'North Sea Empire'.

Due to the Battle of Ashingdon the House of Wessex or 'Cerdicings', as England's first dynasty was known, lost its grip on the English throne and never quite recovered: Edmund's younger brother Edward the Confessor regained his family's crown after the deaths of Canute and his heirs, but was unable to keep it in the family - after his death, Harold Godwinson (whose father Godwin had benefited tremendously from his opportunistic loyalty to Canute and arranged the death of Alfred Æþeling, another of Edmund and Edward's brothers, in 1037) was elected King ahead of the young Cerdicing heir, Edmund Ironside's grandson Edgar Æþeling. Godwinson went on to lose the Battle of Hastings in 1066, bringing the Anglo-Saxon period to an end.

But what if...Edmund Ironside had prevailed at the Battle of Ashingdon? Say that Eadric Streona never gets a chance to betray his overlord. Perhaps his treachery is discovered in time and Edmund relieves him of his head before the battle begins, or he changes his mind and stays loyal, or he is simply thrown from his horse in an accident and dies while en route to the battlefield. The important thing is that, without his betrayal, Edmund manages to decisively defeat Canute: historically, Ashingdon was an extremely close and hard-fought battle, and could have gone either way if not for Streona's ill-timed change of allegiance.

If Edmund were to emerge triumphant, he would be left not only master of the battlefield around Ashingdon, but undisputed ruler of England as well. The Danes certainly would not be in a position to try invading England again any time soon: Canute may even die in this battle and thus leave Denmark in the hands of his newborn sons Sweyn and Harald, but even if he survives it will take many years for him to rebuild his forces for a second try at the British Isles - if he even bothers with such an expedition, instead of refocusing his gaze on much nearer potential conquests in Norway and Sweden.

So what are the long-term effects? Firstly, without the Danish conquest and resulting instability, the House of Wessex would have renewed the security of its hold on the English crown. Edmund Ironside could reasonably expect to enjoy a long and prosperous reign: as a renowned warrior and commander, he would have been of a strong physical constitution, and his father Æthelred and brother Edward lived into their 50s and 60s, respectively, before dying of natural causes. Moreover, with the Danish threat neutralized and no domestic enemies with the strength to seriously oppose him left (not even Eadric Streona), he would be able to preside over England's peaceful recovery from the past decades of turmoil and invasion for at least a few years, perhaps a decade or two if Canute is either dead or loses all interest in attacking England.

Without the reign of Edward the Confessor (who was half-Norman and invited many Normans to fill prominent offices all around England), the Normans do not gain a significant foothold in England. Moreover, without the Confessor's pro-Norman policy and supposed favoring of William of Normandy (the historical Conqueror) as his rightful heir, the Normans would have no justification to attack an England ruled by Edmund Ironside's descendants. Therefore, the Norman Conquest as we know it could not happen.

Godwin, the father of the historical King Harold and his brothers, would not have aligned himself with the Danes in a world where Edmund Ironside won Ashingdon, but instead remained loyal to the House of Wessex. A consummate opportunist and intriguer of boundless ambition who historically managed to elevate himself from a minor thane to 'most powerful man in England' (arguably more-so than his overlord, Edward the Confessor) by the end of his life, this timeline's Godwin would have played up his adherence to Edmund's eldest brother Athelstan as a sign of his loyalty to the Cerdicings. If Eadric Streona's treachery was undone in a way that resulted in Streona's death and/or disgrace, Godwin may be in a position to snap up the earldom of Mercia, especially if the rest of the Saxon high nobility takes as bad a beating at Ashingdon as it did historically. Furthermore, Godwin would not marry Canute's sister-in-law Gyda Thorkilsdottir, but instead go for one of Edmund's widowed sisters if their noble husbands died their historical deaths in 1016; either Ælfgifu, widow of Earl Uhtred of Northumbria, or Wulfhild, widow of Earl Ulfcytel Snilingr of East Anglia. Either way, he has a chance at becoming one of the most powerful men in England as he did historically (just without Wessex itself, which would surely remain a royal demesne in this timeline), and his children or grandchildren could then have the power to make their own play for the throne down the road.

Without a Norse or Norman conquest, Anglo-Saxon culture and administration would survive for much longer. The English aristocracy was already gaining power during the infighting of the 10th century and the weak reign of Æthelred, and while they were historically suppressed and kept in check by Canute, none of that happens without his conquest. As Edmund Ironside will require their support in warding off future Norse threats in the middle to long term and thus not want to 'rock the boat' domestically, the surviving Saxon high nobility would gain even more importance, and we may see the ealdormanries (earldoms) of England become hereditary, autonomous lordships of significant power similar to the French and German peerages on the continent. Trade and political contact with France and the Holy Roman Empire would mean foreign influence on the development of Anglo-Saxon feudalism, but with far more native characteristics being retained due to a lack of a Norman Conquest to completely uproot Anglo-Saxon nobles and traditions: this likely means a longer survival of slavery in England and the emergence of 'bordar' and 'cottarii' (cottager) sub-classes of serfs.

Finally, the Old English language would not have come under Norman or (well, even more) Norse influence, and remained the most widely spoken language in the kingdom with Latin being retained for ecclesiastical and aristocratic usage.

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Thank you for reading all the way to the conclusion! If you like what you've just read, then by all means, please leave a comment. For that matter, if you don't like what you read, leave a comment anyway. I would be happy to receive any questions, suggestions or (civil) criticism you might have.

What If: America breaks down along state lines?

Not feeling too great today, I've got a sore throat and it hurts just to talk or swallow even water. Still, I like sticking to schedules, so here comes the second entry on this blog on a Friday, as I laid out in my first ever post. You can probably already guess what it's going to be about from the title.

When it first gained independence from Britain in the aftermath of the American Revolutionary War in 1781, the United States were not quite as united as they would be by the end of the decade. There was no Constitution: instead, under the original Articles of Confederation the 'country' was essentially a loose league of quasi-independent mini-countries (it's all in the name: 'state' is usually synonymous with 'country'), with a federal government consisting of one Congress that was so ineffective it might as well not have existed at all.

Naturally, this state of affairs could not last. The ramshackle government that was the Congress of the Confederation had no ability to levy a tax (it had to request money from the states); could not regulate interstate commerce (meaning that each state ran up its own separate debts and made its own trade agreements); could not fund a proper military as a result of its constant lack of funds; caused severe inflation that made the Continental Dollar worthless when it did try to print more money; and was unable to stand up to foreign powers due to all of these problems, which meant that among other things the British maintained a military presence on the officially American side of the border up north and Spain extracted the unfavorable Jay-Gardoqui Treaty of 1786 (banning Americans from navigating the Mississippi River for 25 years).

Still, perhaps the worst development stemming from the Articles of Confederation was none of the above, but rather the tendency for the states to fight amongst themselves over territory and resources. For example, Connecticut and Pennsylvania intermittently warred with each other (the 'Pennamite Wars') over the Wyoming Valley on the northern Susquehanna River between 1769 and 1799 and actually got worse after the War of Independence, with Vermont entering the conflict on Connecticut's side until Congress ruled in favor of Pennsylvania's claim to the territory. The disconnect between central state governments & frontier communities and the latter's dissatisfaction with the former resulted in the latter rebelling or trying to secede at times: Shays' Rebellion in Massachusetts 1786-87 and the emergence of the 'State of Franklin' (1784-88) in what is now eastern Tennessee was an especially prominent example of this occurring. Even after the Constitution was ratified, territorial disputes and frontier uprisings continued to threaten the USA into the early 19th century, with examples such as the three-way 'Walton War' between the Carolinas and Georgia in 1804-18, the Toledo War between Ohio and Michigan in the 1830s, and a tax revolt called the Whiskey Rebellion requiring a 13,000-strong force led by George Washington himself to be put down in 1791-94.

Eventually, this state of affairs was ended by the adoption of the Constitution, creating a functioning federal government and keeping the United States...well, united into the 19th century, where it took its first steps towards becoming a great power on the global stage.

But what if...the Constitution never came to pass, and instead the various states deemed their great experiment to be a failure & went their separate ways? With the dissolution of the United States, where there was two countries - including the Vermont Republic, which was technically independent until 1791 - there are now 14. Where does America go from here?

Firstly, we will likely see two large blocs form in the north and south. Up north, the New England states and New York will find it in their interest to enter a coalition to deter potential British aggression; defend themselves from other states, such as Pennsylvania (see the Pennamite Wars above); and reinforce their shared commercial interests, being a collection of maritime states dominated by big merchants. Down south, the states of the Old South from Maryland and Virginia down to Georgia are likely to do the same, this time to counter the specter of Spanish aggression and effectively coordinate efforts against poor white rebels on the frontiers or slave rebels within their borders.

In due time, these coalitions will likely evolve into proper nations, built on the shared cultures and economic systems of the states that comprise them: the Northeast would be on the road to becoming a centralized, naval-oriented republic dominated by ever-more-powerful business magnates as envisioned by Alexander Hamilton, while the Southeast moves towards an aristocratic republic ruled by and for the planter elite with a small middle class surviving in the big cities (such as Richmond and New Bern) and the majority of the population being either white peons, little better than serfs, or black slaves. The Northeast is likely to absorb Pennsylvania and New Jersey, while both nations will face continued resistance from poor white frontiersmen out west that may eventually give rise to a third power: an Appalachian nation of yeoman farmers that is essentially Thomas Jefferson's dream brought to life, agrarian but democratic and with little opportunity to be particularly racist due to having a much smaller black population than the Old South.

Further west, the Great Lakes area may well never be colonized by American settlers, as the disunited states of America would lack the strength to expel Tecumseh's Native American confederacy and their British backers (and the Northeasterners, owing to their trade connections to Britain, would be even more vehemently opposed to taking action against the British). Thus, unless the British withdraw support for them at an inopportune time, we would see the emergence of a Native American state in Ohio, Michigan and Indiana. If the British do drop support for Tecumseh and his people, the Great Lakes could still be overrun by American colonists at a later date, though as they would have settled these territories much later than the original frontier settlements in the Appalachians, these Midwestern colonists may be a much more mixed bunch than the Scots-Irish Appalachians (especially if they include large quantities of immigrants from Europe) and be less inclined to stick together as one country, meaning we will probably see the emergence of multiple smaller states (a Republic of Ohio, a Republic of Michigan, etc.) there.

So what are the long-term effects? Well firstly, much of the western half of the United States would not be settled, at least not by the various American peoples of this timeline. At most, they might be able to break into the sparsely-populated and controlled territory of the Louisiana Purchase, and even that would likely break up into many smaller countries for the same reasons that a successfully colonized Midwest would.

Down south, without American support Texas would either not exist or (in case the Mexicans are still stuck with the leadership of Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, one of the worst generals ever in modern history) be much smaller, unable to expand beyond the Nueces River as it was historically.

Britain would have a free hand to settle all of Oregon, while California and the American southwest would remain under Mexican authority with no united America around to seriously contest any of this. If the butterfly effect fails to prevent the emergence of the Mormons and they are still persecuted across the disunited states of the East to the point where they flee to Utah, they may become the westernmost outpost of American settlement.

Slavery will still not be abolished peacefully, as the advent of the cotton gin makes the practice far too lucrative to let go (much as it did historically) and the South has no federal government to fear. Moreover, the Southern planter elite would still find promoting a racial divide between poor whites and black slaves to be in their interest, preventing these two marginalized and impoverished groups from allying against their mutual overlords. If abolitionism still takes hold in the Northeast, an Underground Railroad would have much closer 'stations' for slaves to finish their journey at: instead of voyaging to Canada, they could 'get off their train' in Pennsylvania or New York. In case the two nations come to blows (perhaps the South sends slave-catchers up north in violation of Northeastern sovereignty, or the Northeast supports slave rebellions south of the border), the South would have a stronger chance of winning early battles and wars before industrialization - a development much more likely to be supported by the Northeast's business tycoons than the agrarian planter aristocracy of the South - greatly expands the divide between the two's wartime strength.

Could a movement or individual emerge to reunite America? Possibly. But they would most likely only emerge in the lands of the original Thirteen Colonies, where there would be any memory of a United States at all: that means in the Northeast, the Appalachians or the South. Even if they prove successful, this 'America' would have little to no power beyond the Appalachians, unless their leaders make the decision to push westward and expand into lands that were never really 'American' and where the people are either Native Americans, foreigners (ex. Mexicans, British and so on) or think of themselves as 'Ohioans', 'Missourians', etc. rather than proper Americans.

Colonialism, at least the variety practiced by the European powers, would remain a much stronger force in the Western Hemisphere without the Monroe Doctrine. Britain, France and Spain would have a much freer hand in manipulating and harassing the Latin American states (if they even emerge, instead of remaining Spanish colonies owing to the butterfly effect). Spain would also likely succeed in holding on to its last colonies, Cuba and the Philippines, with no united America having the strength to wrest these lands from its control.

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Thank you for reading all the way to the conclusion! If you like what you've just read, then by all means, please leave a comment. For that matter, if you don't like what you read, leave a comment anyway. I would be happy to receive any questions, suggestions or (civil) criticism you might have.

What If: The Empire of Majapahit did not decline?

The Sun of Majapahit (Surya Majapahit), the empire's emblem depicting an arrangement of Hindu deities

The Majapahit Empire (Kerajaan Majapahit in Indonesian) was the second major maritime empire based out of present-day Indonesia after the smaller Srivijaya (650-1377) and the largest empire to have existed in Southeast Asia, first emerging in 1293. It grew out of the Javanese kingdom of Singhasari, whose penultimate king Kertanegara was the father-in-law of Majapahit's founder Raden Wijaya: he is famous for taking advantage of a Mongol invasion of Java to oust his overlord, Singhasari's last king Jayakatwang who had usurped the throne from Kertanegara, and then turning on the Mongols to establish himself as the most powerful man in Java.

Majapahit reached the height of its power under Raden Wijaya's grandson Hayam Wuruk, who reigned 1350-1389, and his Mahapatih (prime minister) Gajah Mada. With these two gifted statesmen at its head, the Majapahit Empire grew to rule most of 'Nusantara' - modern-day Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore with the exception of western Java (where the Kingdom of Sunda continued to resist Majapahit expansion even after Gajah Mada wiped out most of their royal family in the Battle of Bubat in 1357, an act of such brutality and recklessness that he was demoted by Hayam Wuruk) and inner Kalimantan.

After Hayam Wuruk's death, Majapahit fell into a civil war called the 'Paregreg War' between his daughter Kusumawardhani (supported by her husband Wikramawardhana) and his younger son Bhre Wirabhumi: although Wikramawardhana and Kusumawardhani had won by 1406, the succession crisis irreparably damaged Majapahit's hegemony over Nusantara. The 15th and 16th centuries saw the gradual loss of Majapahit's territories to new Muslim sultanates, culminating in the fall of Majapahit itself to the Sultanate of Demak in 1527. Islam swept away Hinduism in most of Java, and the replacement of the united Majapahit Empire by a fragmented morass of smaller Muslim states that regularly fought among themselves made Nusantara comparatively easy pickings for European colonial powers (with the Dutch eventually becoming dominant) down the road.

But what if...Majapahit never entered its terminal decline? Suppose the civil war between the children of Hayam Wuruk never occurred. Perhaps Bhre Wirabhumi falls ill and dies before he can challenge his sister's succession, or simply lets the issue slide. Then Majapahit would not have entered its period of decline (at least not at the beginning of the 15th century), it would have been in better shape to resist the incursions of the growing Muslim sultanates, and assuming it survived into the later 16th and early 17th centuries then it would have been the single power meeting the arrival of the Europeans, not a mess of divided petty kingdoms.

So what are the medium to long-term effects? Well, for one thing, Islam would not have become the dominant religion in Java, at least not nearly as quickly as it did in our timeline. The continued survival of Majapahit, a Hindu empire, in turn ensures the survival of Java's Hindu and Buddhist religious communities. This is not to say Islam would never have gained a considerable foothold in Java - the 15th century is too late a point-of-divergence to prevent the arrival of Islam in Indonesia entirely - but it would have been limited to the northern coasts of the island. In time, these Muslims may have been absorbed entirely into the broader syncretic framework of Kejawen, a Javanese spiritual tradition and 'melting pot' combining animist, Buddhist, Hindu and (even today) Muslim influences.

Secondly, the Nusantara region would have been in a better position to handle the arrival of European colonists. When the Portuguese, the Dutch and the English show up from the early 16th century onward, they will find a united empire greeting them instead of a group of small, squabbling petty kingdoms who they were able to divide-and-conquer. As the origin point of the lucrative spice trade and an archipelago nation with a strong naval tradition, large population and contact with the powerful and advanced Chinese to the north, Majapahit certainly would have had the resources to resist violent attempts at European expansion if it doesn't fall into another civil war. It may even be in a position to follow the path of Japan: absorbing, reverse-engineering and natively producing European technology, particularly gunpowder, and being able to effectively resist European colonialism on its own. (there is virtually no chance of Majapahit embracing a Sakoku-like policy of isolation, however: the spice trade is too important to just be cut off and Nusantara is made up of far more small islands than the Japanese archipelago, meaning policing the waters and shores for outsiders would be too difficult to do effectively with 16th-century technology)

From the 16th century onward, the butterfly effect makes further developments too difficult to even remotely accurately predict. An Indonesia where Islam is not the dominant religion and one regional hegemonic power capable of standing up to the Europeans exists would evolve on a completely different trajectory from real-life early modern Indonesia. Among other things, Indonesian nationalism would have much deeper roots than the 20th century; Javanese cultural influence would be much more pervasive throughout the archipelago, as Majapahit itself was based out of Java; and Christianity would likely gain a larger foothold in Java sooner than it did in our timeline, as the kings of Majapahit would welcome the introduction of an extra religious counterbalance to the Muslim states of western and northern Java.

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Thank you for reading all the way to the conclusion! If you like what you've just read, then by all means, please leave a comment. For that matter, if you don't like what you read, leave a comment anyway. I would be happy to receive any questions, suggestions or (civil) criticism you might have.

So, this is a thing now.

To whoever's reading this:

I salute you. And myself, because if you can see this, it means I've successfully published my first ever blog post. Yay to not falling flat on my face straight out of the starting gate!

Now, on to the blog itself. What's this all about, one might wonder? Well, as the title suggests, this is a blog dedicated to alternate (or 'counterfactual', 'speculative', etc.) history. Every week I'll take a look at certain developments in history and try to answer the question of 'well, what if this occurred differently?' What if the Battle of Waterloo had gone the other way, what if World War I never broke out, what if Adolf Hitler got punted to his death by an irate mountain goat at Berghof in 1933...and much, much more.

Naturally I'm going to try to avoid the common clichés that have been explored endlessly elsewhere, things like 'what if the Nazis won WWII'. I'll also welcome suggestions from you, the reader, on interesting points-of-divergence and scenarios to explore - though I'd prefer suggestions that don't fall into clichéd territory.

Finally, I will do my best to update this blog regularly: every Monday, Wednesday and Friday, allowing myself enough time to research, edit and proofread my entries.

Well, I believe that's all. Happy reading and please don't forget to leave comments, folks! Be it praise, criticism (so long as it doesn't cross the lines of civility), questions or suggestions for future entries, I'd like to hear what you have to say.